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When it comes to political communication on social media, Facebook has arisen as one of the 
most important platforms. Recent research on populist discourses provides evidence for 
populist ideology fragments emerging across Facebook posts. Moreover, the level of populist 
language styles and the adoption of typical populist rhetoric appears to be ‘endemic' across 
political actors across the whole political spectrum, even among non-populist ones. In total, 
51 posts from Geert Wilders were analyzed before and 71 in the period after the 2019 Dutch 
elections (N = 122). This study tackles the use of the founding elements of populist 
communication strategies: references to the people, references to the elites, and references to 
the others. For a populist leader, Wilders’ Facebook posts do not contain many references to 
the people. Instead, he focuses on the elites (e.g., the EU) and on the others (e.g., Muslims or 
asylum seekers). The clearest difference between the pre- and post-election period seems to 
be that Wilders gradually changes his populist communication strategies from a focus on the 
elites, to a focus on the others. In doing so, he uses more references to religion and blaming 
the others. He also refers more to people within the country (asylum seekers and immigrants) 
in the post-election period (36,6%) than in the pre-election period (23,5%). His posts show 
clear examples of populist nativism, while he paints a picture of a battle between the 







The Netherlands has seen a rise of populist parties in the last decades, both on the right wing 
(Partij voor de Vrijheid PVV, Forum voor Democratie FvD) and left wing (Socialistische 
Partij SP) spectrum. The core element of the populist ideology that has been mentioned as a 
defining feature is the combination of an advocative position toward the people and 
conflictive one toward the elites (Wirth, Esser, Wettstein, Engesser, Wirz, Schulz & Müller, 
2016; Wirz, 2018). In the words of Mudde (2009, p. 23): populism is “... a thin-centered 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the general will of the people”. Hence, according to Mudde (2009) 
and others (e.g., Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove 2014), populists view the people as sovereign, 
homogenous, and virtuous. Another often mentioned element is that the elites are viewed as 
evil, whereas the people are considered good. This is referred to as a Manichean outlook, in 
the sense that the people are morally superior to the elites.  
A fourth element that has recently often been discussed is nativism. Nativism focusses 
on the idea that one believes to have more rights to be treated fairly, and to receive priority 
treatments when living in the country where one was born. In other words, natives should 
have more rights than non-natives (e.g., asylum seekers, immigrants), because their ancestors 
built the country (see also Hochschild, 2018). The non-natives are treated as others in these 
views. The dream of a White Europe is a clear example of nativism within Right Wing 
populism. Thus, these aspects suggest that there are antagonistic relations between the people 
and the elites, but also between the people and the others. Most recently, Kešić and 
Duyvendak (2019) outline how right-wing discourses and issues of belonging and collective 
identity across Europe can be better comprehended through the logic of nativism, which is 
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categorized, in the illustrative case of the Netherlands, into three subtypes: secularist, racial 
and populist nativism.  
2. The PVV and FvD 
In the Netherlands, the PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid; Party for Freedom) is the oldest right-
wing populist party, founded in 2006, with Geert Wilders as the leader and also the only 
member, as there is no possibility to become a PVV member. Hence, supporters do not have a 
say in the contents of the political program nor in the election of officers. Before the 
foundation of PVV, Geert Wilders was a member of the right-wing party VVD (Volkspartij 
voor Vrijheid en Democratie; People's Party for Freedom and Democracy), which has been 
part of the country’s government for many years since World War 2. When Wilders left the 
VVD in 2005, he founded his own party, the PVV, which has witnessed a steady rise until 
recently. He received 15.5% of the votes in the 2010 elections, which was the peak of his 
popularity, and his party eventually took part in the negotiations for a new government. They 
ended up as supporter of the center-right minority government, although they were not 
officially part of the coalition (‘gedoogconstructie’). The coalition clashed in 2012 when 
Wilders suddenly announced that he would leave the negotiation table, and new elections 
followed. In the 2012 elections, Wilders lost nine seats and went from 24 to 19 seats. Many 
supporters seem to have realized that Wilders has a big mouth towards the government but is 
not capable to enforce or change anything. Klein and Muis (2018) furthermore argue that 
although Wilders receives considerable support from the electorate and his anti-Islam 
statements are often mentioned by the traditional media and during political debates, “all 
established parties ignore or criticize the PVV” (p. 557). After the events that led to the fall of 
the coalition in 2012, this sentiment became even stronger. Since then, many parties declared 
that they did not want to be part of a government coalition that also includes the PVV. In the 
last elections of 2019, the Netherlands has seen the rise of a new right-wing populist party, 
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FvD (Forum voor Democratie; Forum for Democracy), led by Thierry Baudet. This party has 
many young, male supporters and has received a large part of its votes from PVV voters. The 
PVV thus seems to be losing ground. 
3. Populist Ideologies in the Netherlands 
Both Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet display anti-Islam attitudes and Muslims are 
portrayed as ‘the others’ in statements of both. For Wilders this is his primary asset. His 
statements in the Dutch Parliament and on social media, are mostly about Muslims, and his 
plea is to ban Muslim fundamentalism from the Netherlands and Europe. He does not present 
a nuanced view about Muslims but argues that there are many extremists and terrorists among 
Muslims who want to take over the Netherlands, turning it into a Muslim state by applying 
the Sharia. He describes ordinary Muslims as terrorists or Jihad supporters, and he 
specifically targets young male Moroccans, who are known to have a higher crime rate than 
young males from other ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands. Baudet also focuses on 
other political issues, (e.g. climate change) and seems to have a broader populist discourse.  
 Regarding the EU, the PVV and FvD hold slightly differences stances. Wilders has 
always been clear about the EU: he seeks a ‘Nexit’, meaning the Netherlands should leave the 
EU to take back control over immigration issues. Whereas Baudet also expressed a preference 
for a Nexit, his party does not: instead, the FvD wants a referendum about the Euro and 
Europe’s open borders, and to stop the expansion of the EU. Although they state that they are 
against the EU and are in favor of a referendum, they are far more careful when speaking 
about leaving the EU than Wilders. Party members of FvD disagree about their stance on 
Nexit: while party leader Baudet expressed a desire to leave the EU, other party members 
expressed that FvD is not necessarily in favor of leaving. Baudet responded by telling the 
media that he does not recognize himself or his party in these statements, and that he is 
against the EU, against the internal market, against the Euro and against open borders 
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(Dietvorst, 2019). Such disagreements are not expressed within the PVV, but this may also 
result from the fact that Wilders is the PVV and seems to be fully in charge of the party’s 
viewpoints.   
Baudet hardly actively uses Facebook and only published 3 posts during and 3 after 
the elections in 2019. Therefore, we will focus on the Facebook posts of Wilders in this 
report. What do his Facebook posts entail? The majority of his posts are about Muslims, or 
incidents including Muslims, specifically Moroccans (‘Moroccan terrorists’ as he refers to 
them). In 2014, Wilders spoke at a political meeting and asked his supporters whether they 
wanted more or fewer Moroccans in The Hague. He then yelled: ‘What do we want? More or 
fewer Moroccans?’ and the audience bellowed ‘Fewer’, ‘fewer’, ‘fewer’ for minutes. On the 
basis of this incident, he was prosecuted by The Hague court, for eliciting hate and 
discrimination of a whole group. His process still continues till today. His obsession with 
Islam and Moroccans is clearly reflected in his Facebook posts. Many of his Facebook posts 
merely contain more than one or two words, such as ‘stop Islam’, or ‘Burka stop’. The latter 
refers to a much-discussed law that was proposed by Wilders and installed in 2019, which 
forbids wearing a burka in Dutch public places. Especially given the fact that there are only 
around 200 women wearing a burka in the Netherlands, this law is generally considered 
symbol politics and many mayors have said that they cannot and will not uphold this law.   
His plea against Muslims is also embedded in a nativist ideology, which is illustrated 
by the subtitle of his political program: The Netherlands should be back in our hands 
("Nederland weer van ons"). Whereas in his Facebook posts the others are Muslims, Wilders 
also refers to the elites, which is either the EU, the government, the public prosecutor’s office 
or individual politicians. He mainly criticizes them for being weak and not competent to fight 
the increasing influence of Muslim culture and politics in the Netherlands. For example, he 
fiercely criticized that Muslimas can have swimming lessons in a protected environment in 
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the public swimming pool of Maassluis, which he sees as the start of a Muslim state. It went 
viral among his supporters on social media and the swimming pool had to hire security in 
order to protect the bathers against right wing aggressors. He also thinks that the state does 
not offer sufficient protection against the influence of criminal Moroccans, and he constantly 
claims that they should be sent either to prison, but preferably back to Morocco. He refers to 
these Moroccan men as the ‘swimming pool terrorists’. 
4. Social Media use by Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet  
When it comes to political communication on social media, Facebook has arisen as one of the 
most important platforms. Recent research on populist discourses provides evidence for 
populist ideology fragments emerging across Facebook posts. Moreover, the level of populist 
language styles and the adoption of typical populist rhetoric appears to be ‘endemic' across 
political actors across the whole political spectrum, even among non-populist ones 
(Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018). 
Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet both use several social media platforms. Both of 
them have the highest number of followers on Twitter, the platform they seem to be used 
most often, followed by Instagram for Baudet and Facebook for Wilders. In Facebook’s Ad 
Library, an archive that provides details about paid ads by companies or political parties, we 
see that Wilders never used Facebook for paid advertisements. With more than 300.000 likes 
and high engagement levels (with a maximum of 1800 comments and 469 shares for one 
post), he may not have to. Although Baudet only posted six times around the elections, his 
posts are shared even more frequently than Wilders’ posts: his pre-election post where he 
challenged Dutch prime-minister Mark Rutte for a one-on-one debate, was shared almost one 
thousand times. Considering his number of likes (around 45.000), his page seems to show 
higher levels of engagement than Wilders’ Facebook page. Just like Wilders, Baudet does not 
use paid advertisements on his personal Facebook profile.  
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 Whereas Wilders’ personal page is far more popular than his party’s page (314.000 
likes versus just under 13.000 likes for the PVV page), for Baudet we see the opposite. FvD’s 
profile has almost 200.000 likes, more than four times the number of followers Baudet has on 
the platform. This seems to fit their communication strategies: whereas Baudet is building a 
party with a big youth department, Wilders wants to remain the only member of the PVV and 
does not seem interested in expanding the party beyond his own persona. Klein and Muis 
(2018) furthermore argue that Wilders keeps “tight control over all party communication” (p. 
551), which might explain why he focuses more on his own page than on the party’s page. 
When analyzing Facebook posts from Wilders, we notice that he not once mentions the party 
leader for the PVV in the European parliament. It is all about Wilders, while other party 
members do not seem to matter.  We do not find any paid Facebook advertisements by the 
PVV nor the FvD during the European elections, but it is clear that FvD started using paid 
advertisements a lot more since then (with thirteen paid ads in august). When it comes to paid 
advertisements, we can conclude that the use by Dutch populist leaders on Facebook is almost 
absent. This is in sharp contrast with other countries: in the UK, for instance, political parties 
spent 3.2 million pounds on Facebook during the 2017 election campaigns (Sabbagh, 2018), 
whereas Trump and Clinton spent a staggering amount of $81 million during the 2016 
presidential campaign (Wagner, 2017).  
5. Populist Communication Strategies on Facebook: Geert Wilders  
In total, 51 posts from Geert Wilders were analyzed before the election and 71 in the period 
after the elections (N = 122). In this section we will focus on Wilders’ use of the founding 
elements of populist communication strategies: references to the people, references to the 












Chart 1: Use of Populist Communication Strategies (Geert Wilders)  
 
a. The People 
Interestingly, Wilders almost never talks about the people in his Facebook posts. The fight is 
between him and the elites, who does not stand up against the criminal and extremist 
Muslims. The people are mostly portrayed as the victims of Muslims, but they are not 
identified, and they are only explicitly referred to. In total, only 9% of his posts contain a 
reference to the people (‘our own people’ ‘the citizens’), with only a minor difference 
between the pre-election period (7,8%) and the post-election period (9,9%).  
A higher number of posts contain a reference to an identity group (17,2%, ‘the Dutch’ 
‘we’ ‘voters’ ‘Jews’ ‘non-believers’), although references are still quite vague and explicit, 
just like references to the people. The differences between the pre-election period (17,6%) 
and the post-election period (16,9%) are very small. Only 4,9% of the posts refer to a 


















reference to the heartland. When it comes to common fate or history, no references were 
made in the pre-election period (0%), whereas 8,5% of post-election posts contain a reference.   
 
Chart 2: References to the People – most used strategies (Geert Wilders)  
 
A larger share of Wilders’ posts refers to a similarity (10,7% ‘we are being cheated on’), a 
strategy that is used more than twice as much in the pre-election period (15,7%) than in the 
post-election period (7,0%). In total, 10,7% of posts refer to geographical proximity 
(‘Netherlands’ ‘the Dutch’), of which 13,7% in the pre-election period and 8,5% in the post-
election period. Only 0,8% of posts praise the people’s achievements or the people’s virtues 
(‘Courageous Dutch people who defended their culture’). 1,6% of posts demanded 
sovereignty of the people, with a reference towards the EU instead of the elites (‘the 
Netherlands should be a free country again. No longer enslaved by Brussels! Down with the 
EU!’). Much more of Wilders’ post include a reference to people as victims or victimization 
(13,9%), a strategy that was increasingly used after the elections (pre-election period: 9,8%, 
post-election period: 16,9%). A majority of these posts mentioned Muslims or Islam 




















b. The Elites 
Referring to the elites is by far the most common strategy of Geert Wilders (41% of his 
Facebook posts). Interestingly, this number is much higher in the pre-election period (49,0%), 
when almost half of his posts refer to the elites, compared to the post-election period (35,2%), 
although the proportion is high in both cases. In 31,1% of all posts Wilders discredits the 
elites, with a slightly higher proportion during the post-election period (32,4%) than during 
the pre-election period (29,4%). When discrediting the elites, during the pre-election period 
he mostly focuses on the EU (‘the EU is an attack on our national sovereignty’ ‘Europhile 
Macron’ ‘the EU monster’). In the post-election period, the focus is more on Dutch politicians 
(one mayor in particular) or institutions (Public Prosecution Service). In 27,0% of his posts 
Wilders blames the elites (‘The EU makes deporting of criminal asylum seekers among which 
rapists, child porn lovers and murderers, impossible. Unacceptable. That’s why #NEXIT’). 
The number is around ten percent higher in the post-election period (pre-election: 21,6%, 
post-election: 31,0%). To a far lesser extent Wilders denies the elites' legitimacy to represent 
the people (4,1% in total, ‘EU fairy tale D66 falls apart. Turns out to be a complete 
nightmare. Down with the fortune seekers! Vote PVV’). Only 2,5% of posts contain visual 
information about the elites.   





c. The Others 
Compared to references to the elites, Wilders refers slightly less often to the others (38,5% in 
total). The difference between the pre-election (25,5%) and post-election period (47,9%) is 
remarkable and reversed when compared to references to the elites, a strategy that is used by 
Wilders more often in the pre-election period (49,0%) than in the post-election period 
(35,2%). Wilders thus seems to have changed his populist communication strategies after the 
elections.  
As expected, most Facebook posts refer to Muslims, Islam, Moroccans, or asylum 
seekers when referring to the others in a critical way (‘criminal asylum seekers’ ‘Muslim 
terrorist’). The majority of these posts contain strong statements about asylum seekers 
(‘raping, child abusing, and murdering asylum seekers’) or references (‘scum’). Only 1,8% of 
posts refer to foreigners staying outside of the country (‘#AsiaBibi free now after leaving 
barbaric #Pakistan’), while 31,1% of posts contain references to those already in the 
















rise over time: whereas 23,5% of Wilders’ posts contain references to people already in the 
Netherlands before the elections, this rises to 36,6% after the elections (with a focus on 
‘Moroccan pool terrorists’, ‘rape jihad’, ‘Islam’ and ‘burqa wearers’). Interestingly, he does 
not make any references at all about others outside of the country who could potentially come 
to the Netherlands in the future or are already on their way (refugees, immigrants). Wilders 
also does not make any references to the economically rich or the economically poor when 
referring to the others. Only 0,8% of his posts that mention the others contain references to 
political opponents; 4,9% refer to cultural or ethnical values or patterns.  
29,5% of Wilders’ Facebook posts contain references to the others in a religious way, 
mostly about Muslims, Islam or asylum seekers. This number almost doubles after the 
elections (36,6%) compared to the pre-election period (19,6%). Before the election, he 
focuses mostly on Islam and sometimes empathizes with Judaism or Israel:  
 
‘The innocent victims were beheaded by them. Their great example Mohammed 
decapitated all (nearly 900) men of the Jewish tribe Banu Qurayza in the year 627 in 
Medina. Not much has changed. Unfortunately. #stopislam’.  
 
In the post-election period, he is exclusively referring to Muslims and Islam (‘Islamic 
grooming gangs’ ‘rape jihad’). Other strategies Wilders uses on Facebook are exclusion of 
others (23,0%, with minor differences between pre- and post-election period), discrediting of 
the others (20,5% in total, 17,6% pre-election and 22,5% post-election), and blaming the 
others (14,8%). Blaming the others also went up significantly after the elections (pre-
elections: 9,8%, post-elections: 18,3%).   
 





When referring to exclusion of the others, Wilders mostly speaks about closing the borders 
and sending away asylum seekers, but he also advocates against the EU:  
 
‘The polling stations are open! Vote against mass immigration, against Islamization, 
against the EU super state! Choose for the Netherlands, our own culture, and our 
sovereignty! Choose for collaboration with the heroes of Europe such as Salvini! 
CHOOSE PVV! #VotePVV #EP2019 #Nexit’  
 
When discrediting the others, he only mentions Muslims and asylum seekers, who are ‘raping 
and murdering’ people. We see the same mechanisms when he is blaming the others, for 
which strategy he also focusses on ‘criminal’ asylum seekers and Islam.   
6. Leadership Style 
Geert Wilders does not seem to use Facebook much for the construction of leadership. First of 
all, almost none of his posts contain references to communication strategies that are 
associated with the relation between a political leader and the people. Only 1,6% of his posts 



















battle but we will win the game. For a better and safer Netherlands and against Islam. Full 
steam ahead! #PVV #PVV #PVV’).  None of his posts contain indicators of a service approach 
of the leader towards the people (0,0%) nor indicators of the equality of the leader and the 
people (0,0%).  
 The others communication strategies are associated with visionary leadership in 
populism and are used by Wilders more often. 7,4% of all posts contain elements about his 
long-term vision, but it is especially the difference between the pre- and post-election period 
that stands out: before the elections, 15,7% of his posts contain elements about a long-term 
vision, but that number goes down to 1,4% after the elections. It thus seems like Wilders 
actively uses this strategy to attract more voters. All references he makes here are about the 
Netherlands, or about closing the borders to stop immigration. He paints the picture that the 
Netherlands is an unsafe place, and that you should vote for him if you want that to change. 
His main slogan to support that claim is ‘Nexit’ or ‘#Nexit’. Only 1,6% of his posts contain 
elements about stressing unconventional or risk-taking behavior. These posts are about 
Muslims who wanted to assassinate Wilders (‘This criminal and Islamic terrorist 
#KhadimHussainRizvi put a fatwa on my head to kill me. How can he be released??’). No 
posts contain articulations about the need to reconstruct the past, which say that the leader is 
remaining faithful to a specific set of ideas, or the leader communicating his remembrance to 
his past by emphasizing that he is still thinking the same, sharing the same value or having the 
same political partners.  
7. Analysis of Baudet’s Facebook Posts 
The few posts Baudet shared on Facebook before and after the elections are of a different 
nature than Wilders’ posts. In his six posts, he does not refer to immigrants or demonizes 
them like Wilders does. He instead uses Facebook for mobilization: either towards his voters, 
or towards the prime minister when he directly addresses him in challenging him for a one-
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on-one debate. Two out of six posts are short messages that directly address voters, in which 
he announces party meetings. Two other posts are meant for prime minister Rutte. In these 
posts he explicitly states that he wants a debate outside of the Dutch public broadcaster NPO, 
and instead wants to broadcast the debate live via Facebook. Given the fact that he rarely uses 
Facebook in his campaign, this seems to be an interesting proposal. He furthermore treats the 
public broadcaster as part of the elites here. He further discredits the elites by asking Rutte if 
he dares to debate him. Although Baudet is critical of the elites, he has also been criticized for 
being elitist himself. He held his inauguration speech in Latin when he was installed in 
parliament, and his victory speech after the provincial elections contained references to poetry 
and Greek mythology. As Tempelman (2019) argues, by using sophisticated language Baudet 
shows that he is different from other populist leaders; he even called himself ‘the most 
important intellectual of the Netherlands’ (Niemandsverdriet, 2016). One of his Facebook 
posts contains references to an essay he wrote about Michel Houellebecq and the writer’s 
critique on liberalism. This is very different from Wilders’ clear-cut, easy to understand 
statements, that are clearly meant for the average Dutchman.  
8. National Particularities  
The most remarkable aspect of Geert Wilders’ Facebook posts is the fact that he rarely refers 
to the people. Wilders thus has less of an advocative position towards the people, and mainly 
carries out his conflictive position towards the corrupt elites and towards the others. In the 
pre-election period, he often combines these groups in one statement: the others are Muslims 
or asylum seekers, and the elites is the EU, the Dutch parliament or Dutch political parties. 
Because of the elites, we cannot solve the problems that followed mass immigration. He also 
actively connects other Dutch parties or politicians to the European Union ‘Europhiles’, 




‘VVD and D66 together with Europhile Macron on their way towards much more EU 
and less of the Netherlands. That means even more immigration and Islam, even more 
transfer union and even more power to Brussels. Choose the Netherlands. Borders 
closed. Our money for our own people. #Nexit #VotePVV’  
 
‘D66 defends EU rules that prohibit the deportation of murderous and raping asylum 
seekers. Unbelievable. #Next #VotePVV’ 
 
Only two of his posts in which he blames the elites in the pre-election period are about other 
subjects than immigration, both are about climate policy. On his Facebook page, Wilders does 
not seem to adopt a pure Manichean outlook: although the elites is indeed viewed as evil, the 
focus is not on good Dutch citizens, but on evil Muslims or asylum seekers. In doing so, 
Wilders predominantly posts negative messages on the social media platform. He furthermore 
ends a high number of his pre-election posts with ‘#VotePVV’ and ‘#Nexit’, and some with 
other hashtags (such as ‘#closetheborders or #stopislam’). After the elections his focus shifts 
to Dutch politics and institutions, who then form the elites that are to blame for the problems 
following immigration. Wilders almost exclusively refers to Muslims, Islam, and Moroccans, 
the embodiment of ‘the others’. While doing this, he does not seem afraid of being accused of 
being a racist – if anything, it might strengthen his arguments. This is in line with earlier 
research on Wilders’ Twitter posts in 2013, that showed that he primarily used Twitter to post 
“inflammatory, anti-Islamic content (…) as a method to arouse supporters” (Blaquart & Cook, 
2013, p. 3). Already then, he used Twitter almost exclusively to criticize Islam in a hateful 
way, proclaim anti-immigration messages, and to spread anti-establishment messages that 
were mostly anti EU.  
Wilders clearly distances himself from Dutch politicians, who are considered part of 
the elites. He does, however, reach out to other populist parties in Europe (‘I’ll be there. 
Tomorrow. Milan. Together with the heroes of Europe and Matteo Salvini in particular! Ci 
  
18 
vediamo domani! #VotePVV #StopEU’). He even mentions them in a Facebook post in the 
post-election period, when the PVV lost three seats the European Parliament:  
 
‘Currently zero, and after Brexit one seat in EP. Disappointing result. Fortunately, 
our friends in Italy, France and Flanders have won a lot. Congratulations Matteo, 
Marine and Tom! The PVV will return as well. We have the best ideas. Looking 
forward to it! Let’s get to work! #PVV’ 
 
 With these posts, Wilders clearly demonstrates that he considers himself part of the anti-EU 
group within the European Parliament.  
9. Conclusion 
For a populist leader, Geert Wilders’ Facebook posts do not contain many references to the 
people. Instead, he focuses on the elites and the others. The clearest difference between the 
pre- and post-election period seems to be that Wilders gradually changes his communication 
strategies from a focus on the elites, to a focus on the others. In doing so, he uses more 
references to religion and blaming the others. He also refers more to people within the country 
(asylum seekers and immigrants) in the post-election period (36,6%) than in the pre-election 
period (23,5%). His posts show clear examples of populist nativism, while he paints a picture 
of a battle between the Netherlands and the EU, Muslims, and the elites. He often combines 
references to Muslims or asylum seekers (the others) with references to the EU (the elites). He 
furthermore does not shy away from making harsh statements about Muslims or Islam, who 
are referred to as ‘scum’, ‘rapists’, and ‘criminals’. He focuses fully on immigrants already in 
the Netherlands, and not on potential newcomers, such as Syrian refugees. After the European 
elections of 2019, in which the PVV lost all their seats, references to exclusion of the others, 
discrediting of the others, and blaming the others all increased. Wilders additionally does not 
seem to use his Facebook page for the construction of his leadership, although his pre-election 
posts contained significantly more references to his long-term vision than his post-election 
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posts. Because Thierry Baudet only posted six times during the election period, his posts were 
not used for our main analysis. A quick look at the data, however, implies that he does seem 
to use different strategies than Wilders does. More research is needed to explore the 
differences in style between the two leaders, and to examine whether Baudet uses his 
Facebook page more often for references to the people or if he also focuses on the elites 
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